Sequential Mechanisms with ex-post Participation Guarantees by Ashlagi, Itai et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
60
3.
07
22
9v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  5
 Ju
l 2
01
6
Sequential Mechanisms with ex-post Participation Guarantees∗
Itai Ashlagi
Stanford MS&E
Constantinos Daskalakis
MIT CSAIL
Nima Haghpanah
MIT CSAIL
July 6, 2016
Abstract
We provide a characterization of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanisms in settings where
a monopolist sells k items over k periods to a buyer who realizes his value for item i in the
beginning of period i. We require that the mechanism satisfies a strong individual rationality
constraint, requiring that the stage utility of each agent be positive during each period. We
show that the optimum mechanism can be computed by solving a nested sequence of static
(single-period) mechanisms that optimize a tradeoff between the surplus of the allocation and
the buyer’s utility. We also provide a simple dynamic mechanism that obtains at least half of
the optimal revenue. The mechanism either ignores history and posts the optimal monopoly
price in each period, or allocates with a probability that is independent of the current report of
the agent and is based only on previous reports. Our characterization extends to multi-agent
auctions. We also formulate a discounted infinite horizon version of the problem, where we
study the performance of “Markov mechanisms.”
∗This work was supported by ONR grant N00014-12-1-0999, and NSF Awards CCF-0953960 (CAREER), CCF-
1551875 and SES-1254768. Part of this work was done while the authors were visiting the Simons Institute for Theory
of Computing.
1 Introduction
How should a monopolist sell an item to a buyer whose value for the item will only be realized next
week? For example, consider selling a flight to some executive who may or may not have a meeting
with a client next week. Suppose that both the seller and the buyer only know a distribution, F ,
from which the buyer’s value, v, for the item will be drawn. One way the seller could go about this
is to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer today. The offer reads “pay E[v] today to get the item next
week.” A risk-neutral buyer would find this offer attractive, hence the seller would extract the full
surplus, E[v].
The unsettling feature of the afore-described mechanism is that, for some realizations of v, the
buyer ends up with negative utility. In particular, while our mechanism is interim Individually
Rational (IR), it is not ex-post IR. How could we fix this? One way is to wait until next week,
and make a take-it-or-leave-it offer of the item at an optimal monopoly price, i.e. some price p
maximizing p · (1− F (p)). The new mechanism is clearly ex-post IR, but its revenue could be much
smaller than that of our previous mechanism. Quite naturally, our new mechanism extracts the
best possible revenue among all ex-post IR mechanisms, as a simple argument can establish. One
practical reason to study optimal mechanisms subject to ex-post IR conditions is consumer protec-
tion laws Kra¨hmer and Strausz (2015). For example, the European Union adopted a legislation in
2011 demanding online retailers to give buyers the right for free return, effectively ensuring ex-post
IR, since the buyer may not know the value for an item bought online before inspecting it.
Now let us consider a slightly more complex scenario, where our executive is a frequent flyer
who may be attending meetings every week depending on client needs. Every week i his value,
vi, for flying that week is drawn from a known distribution, Fi. How should a seller sell tickets
to such an executive? To build intuition let us consider the case of two weeks. Suppose that our
executive has already realized his value for week 1 and is as uncertain as the seller about his value
for week 2. What is the best way to sell to such a buyer? Extending our interim IR mechanism
from before, we can sell both flights today, offering this week’s flight for the optimal monopoly price
under F1 and next week’s flight for E[v2]. Again, this mechanism is interim IR and optimizes our
revenue (by extracting optimal surplus tomorrow and optimal revenue today). On the other hand,
the mechanism is not ex-post IR.
It seems natural then that, if we were to insist on satisfying ex-post IR, our only option would
be to wait until next week to sell next week’s flight at the optimal monopoly price for distribution
F2, thereby extracting the sum of today’s and next week’s optimal revenue. Quite surprisingly this
is not the case! Here is an example by Papadimitriou et al. 2016 that extracts more revenue than
the sum of single day optimal revenues:
Example 1. Suppose that the value of the first item is drawn from an equal revenue distribution
truncated at n and the value of the second item is drawn from an equal revenue distribution
truncated at en, for some constant n.1 If we were to run two monopoly pricing mechanisms in
sequence, our expected revenue would equal 2. However, the following auction performs much
better. The buyer is requested to submit a bid b in the first stage of the mechanism, and is given
the first item at a price of b, together with a contract that he will receive the second item at price 0
and with probability bn+1 . It is easy to check that truthful reporting is a weakly dominant strategy
1Recall that the equal revenue distribution has support [1,+∞), density function f(x) = 1
x2
and cumulative
density function F (x) = 1− 1
x
. The equal revenue distribution truncated at some threshold T has support [1, T ] and
density fT that equals f for x < T and has an atom at x = T of total probability mass
1
T
.
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and the proposed mechanism is strongly ex-post IR and has Θ(log n) expected revenue. As n is
arbitrary, this means that there is an unbounded gap between running two Myerson auctions in
sequence and the optimal ex-post IR dynamic mechanism.
Results. In this paper, we provide a characterization of the revenue-optimal, ex-post IR, dynamic
mechanism over k days and involving m bidders whose values are independent. In particular, we
optimize the seller’s revenue subject to the following strong individual rationality condition: at
each period, the stage utility of each agent, defined to be his surplus from that period’s allocation
minus the agent’s payment, must be non-negative. In particular, the non-negativity of the stage
utilities implies that, at the end of each period, each agent’s realized utility from participating in
the mechanism so far is non-negative. See Theorem 7 for the single-bidder and Theorem 16 for the
multi-bidder characterization results. As an application of our characterization we can argue, e.g.,
that the mechanism described in Example 1 is optimal (see Example 5 for a generalized example).
Our characterization reveals structural properties of optimal mechanisms. We show that there
exists an optimal mechanism in which, in all periods except for possibly the last, the stage utility
of all realized types of the agent is zero; that is, every type is asked to pay its surplus from the
allocation. Moreover, the mechanism makes simple updates to a scalar state variable that dictates
its future allocations and payments. More precisely, we show that an optimal mechanism can be
described via two functions that depend only on the current state of the mechanism and the agent’s
bid (rather than the full history of bids): an allocation function that specifies the probability of
allocating the item (and hence the payment due to the afore-described surplus extraction), and
a state update function that specifies how the state variable should be updated. We provide a
characterization of allocation and state update functions that will result in feasible mechanisms,
and a recursive family of static single-dimensional problems, the solution to which are the optimal
allocation and state update functions. These can be identified via backwards induction. We pro-
vide a Fully Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme to compute the description of the optimal
mechanism to within any desired error.
Our characterization also allows us to design simple single-bidder mechanisms that guarantee
at least half of the optimal revenue for any k. While the optimal mechanism needs to carefully
balance revenue gain at each period with updating the state variable in a manner that allows for
more revenue in the future, the 2-approximately optimal mechanism is based on much simpler
tradeoffs. We show that randomizing over two simple mechanisms gives a 2-approximation to the
optimal revenue. The first mechanism simply ignores all history and myopically maximizes revenue
in each period. The second mechanism ignores the bidder’s report in each period to compute the
allocation in that period. Instead it allocates the item with a probability that only depends on the
state variable, which itself is updated as a simple function of each period’s allocation probability
and bidder report. Thus, compared to the optimal mechanism, the 2-approximation is described
using fewer parameters. Similarly to the optimal mechanism, the 2-approximation is found via
backwards induction.2
In Section 4, we formulate an infinite horizon version of the problem with discounts, and argue
that restricting attention to “Markov mechanisms,” whose allocation in each period is homogeneous
and only depends on the current and the previous period’s report by the bidder, does not improve
revenue compared to posting optimal monopoly prices in every period.
2We thank Song Zuo for pointing out an issue with the mechanism in an earlier version of the paper, which is
corrected in this version.
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Our Approach. One approach to finding the optimal dynamic mechanism is to attempt a k
period dynamic programming formulation. Let us focus on the single-bidder case. We are seeking
an optimal collection of allocation and price rules, (xi(v≤i), pi(v≤i))
k
i=1, where xi(v≤i) represents
the probability that the item is allocated to the bidder in period i, as a function of his reports v≤i
in all periods up to period i, and pi(v≤i) records the expected price paid by the bidder in period i.
What makes the problem challenging is that the choices we make for the allocation and payment
in period i will affect the incentive constraints for all periods < i. This makes the representation
complexity of the internal states of the naive dynamic programming formulation explode. Yet,
our characterization shows that a more tractable dynamic programming formulation exists. The
interesting feature of our formulation is that is nests its subproblems in the opposite way than the
naive one, namely the last period’s optimization sits inside the nested sequence of problems while
the first period’s optimization sits outside. More importantly, it maintains a sparse representation
of the decisions made by the dynamic program in periods > i that it passes on to period i. These
are the cumulative tradeoff functions gˆi(·) in Theorems 7 and 16. In particular, the information
does not explode (in the number of periods) as we exit the nested optimizations of our dynamic
programming formulation. Ultimately, to implement the optimal dynamic mechanism we need to
do two passes over the periods, one starting from period k and moving backwards toward period 1
to find the gˆi’s (the “preprocessing step” in Theorems 7 and 16) and another, taking place as the
mechanism interacts with the agent, starting from period 1 and moving forward towards period k
to find the allocation and price rule in each period (Step 1 in the theorems).
At the heart of our characterization result/dynamic programming formulation lies a type of
surplus-utility tradeoff problem (see Definition 1 and Definition 4 for our single- and multi-agent
characterizations respectively). The goal in this problem is to optimize a linear combination of the
allocation’s surplus and a function g(·) of the bidders’ utilities, subject to a given constraint on
the expected utility of the mechanism. The preprocessing step of our characterization theorems
requires solving a sequence of such problems starting from period k and moving backwards towards
period 1. In the absence of the utility term in the objective, this problem can be formulated in
terms of the allocation function, and can be point-wise optimized leading to 0-1 allocation rules.
With the utility term, it becomes more natural to formulate the problem in terms of the bidder’s
utility function. In Appendix A we characterize the optimum of this problem and show that the
optimal mechanism may involve fractional allocations.
To provide some intuition about our characterization results (Theorems 7 and 16), let us consider
the two-period single bidder case. Our reduction to surplus-utility tradeoff works roughly as follows.
The optimal dynamic mechanism reduces to finding an allocation and price rule (x1(v1), p1(v1))
for the first stage, which can only depend on the buyer’s value for the first item, along with an
allocation and price rule (x2(v1, v2), p2(v1, v2)) for the second stage, which may depend on both
values. The goal is to maximize revenue (Expression (3)) subject to IC (Inequalities (1)) and IR
(Inequalities (2)) constraints. The challenge is that the optimizations of (x1, p1) and (x2, p2) are
entangled. In particular, the IC condition for period 1 involves both (x1, p1) and (x2, p2).
We are hence looking for a way to disentangle the optimization problems in the two periods. We
use a simple change of variables to rewrite our problem as optimizing the expected (w.r.t. v1) sum of
an (adjusted) payment pˆ1(v1) from the first stage and the buyer’s expected surplus Ev2 [v2x2(v1, v2)]
in the second stage. This optimization is subject to the adjusted mechanism ((x1, pˆ1), (x2, p2))
satisfying incentive compatibility along with the additional constraint that, point-wise w.r.t. v1,
the adjusted utility uˆ1(v1) := v1x1(v1)− pˆ1(v1) in the first stage upper bounds the expected (w.r.t.
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v2) utility of the second stage, given v1. See formulation (11). Crucially, the IC constraints on
(x1, pˆ1) do not involve (x2, p2) and vice versa. The two problems now only interface through the
bound on the utility of (x2, p2) as determined by (x1, pˆ1) and the reported value v1. To capture
this interface, we define a cumulative tradeoff function gˆ2, mapping a given upper bound on the
utility of the second stage mechanism to the maximum welfare achievable in the second stage.
(See Definitions 2 and 5 for general k.) Hence, the dynamic mechanism design problem reduces
to an instance of surplus-utility tradeoff: optimize the expected (w.r.t. v1) sum of the adjusted
payment pˆ1(v1) in the first stage and gˆ2(uˆ1(v1)). The latter problem only involves (x1, pˆ1), while
computing the cumulative tradeoff function only involves (x2, p2). See Section 3 for more details
and generalization to k periods and multiple agents.
RelatedWork. The literature on dynamic mechanism design is rather broad (see Bergemann and Said
(2011)), but has a different focus than ours. The main thrusts in this literature study dy-
namic arrivals and departures of agents, e.g. Parkes and Singh (2003); Pai and Vohra (2008);
Gershkov and Moldovanu (2009, 2010), or agents whose private information evolves, e.g. Courty and Hao
(2000); Kakade et al. (2013); Pavan et al. (2014); Cavallo et al. (2006); Cavallo (2008); Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki
(2010); Athey and Segal (2013); Eso˝ and Szentes (2007). These papers analyze quite general dy-
namic mechanism design settings, involving several bidders and several stages, but fall short from
capturing even our single-bidder two-stage problem. The difference lies in the strong participation
constraints that we choose to enforce in this paper, guaranteeing that all types receive positive
utility from having participated in the mechanism so far, at the end of each round. Instead, prior
literature considers weaker notions of individual rationality requiring that, in the beginning of each
round of the mechanism, the expected utility from all future rounds be positive. As discussed ear-
lier, the latter notion of individual rationality results in mechanisms that we do not find compelling
in our setting, so we are motivated to study the stronger notion of individual rationality.
Closer to our work are recent works of Papadimitriou et al. (2016) and (Kra¨hmer and Strausz,
2015), which consider dynamic mechanisms with ex-post IR guarantees. Papadimitriou et al. 2016
consider the same dynamic mechanism design setting that we do, but focus on the computational
complexity of finding the optimal dynamic mechanism. They show that when the buyer’s values are
correlated, finding the optimal deterministic mechanism is NP-hard, while the optimal randomized
mechanism can be computed via an LP whose size is polynomial in the support of the type distri-
bution. In comparison to that work, we aim at characterizing the structure of the optimal dynamic
mechanism and allow randomization. Kra¨hmer and Strausz (2015) consider a problem where the
seller has a single item to sell and the buyer sequentially receives signals about his valuation. Their
model is thus different from our setting where the seller and the buyer have a common prior from
which the values are drawn, and where there are multiple items to sell. They show that in their
setting, the optimal mechanisms are static in the sense that the seller does not elicit the buyer’s
information sequentially.
Our work is related to the repeated sales and dynamic pricing literature (see Devanur et al.
(2015); Babaioff et al. (2012) and references therein). In Devanur et al. (2015) and related papers,
the seller sells different items to the same buyer over multiple rounds, but is unable to make
commitments and must therefore play a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In Babaioff et al. (2012) and
related papers, the seller sells a limited supply of items to a stream of i.i.d. buyers from an unknown
distribution, and they use the connection to multi-armed bandits to design competitive mechanisms.
Given that the buyers are different in every round there are no incentive constraints across different
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rounds.
Independently and contemporaneously to our work, Mirrokni et al. (2016b) consider the same
problem studied here, where a seller wishes to maximize revenue subject to an ex-post individual
rationality constraint. They propose a class of mechanisms called bank account mechanisms. Bank
account mechanisms maintain a scalar state variable, called “balance,” that is updated in the course
of the execution of the mechanism. In every round, the allocation and the price depend on the
bidder’s report and the balance, and the update of the balance is specified by a “spend” and a
“deposit” function. Overall a bank account mechanism is described by four functions. In earlier
work, Mirrokni et al. (2016a) show that bank account mechanisms can be used in dynamic settings
to derive optimal mechanisms with interim individual rationality constraints. In Mirrokni et al.
(2016b) they show how to derive optimal mechanisms with ex post individual rationality constraints.
The optimal mechanisms identified by our work and theirs both maintain a scalar state variable, but
the two mechanisms are different.. For example, our optimal mechanism satisfies a zero stage utility
property, i.e. extracts the bidder’s full surplus from his allocation in each period except possibly the
last. Similar to our simple 2-approximation, Mirrokni et al. (2016b) specify a simple bank account
mechanism that achieves a 3-approximation to the optimal revenue. Finally, Mirrokni et al. (2016b)
provide extensions to multiple items, whereas our work provides extensions to multiple bidders. Our
work is straightforwardly extendable to multiple items, and we believe their work is extendable to
multiple bidders.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a dynamic mechanism design problem, where a seller sells k items sequentially in k
stages. The buyer has value vi ∈ [vi, v¯i] for item i ∈ [1 : k], drawn independently from his other
values from a distribution with density fi and cumulative density Fi. Our results also apply to
distributions with discrete support, but we will restrict our attention to distributions with a density
function. Moreover, whenever convenient we may assume without loss of generality that vi = 0.
Back to our dynamic mechanism setting, we assume that the value for each item is revealed to the
buyer in the beginning of the corresponding stage; in particular, the buyer only knows v1, . . . , vi,
denoted v≤i, when buying item i. The goal is to design a revenue optimal mechanism for selling
these k items with strong participation guarantees, as formalized below.
We use the revelation principle and design direct incentive compatible mechanisms. A mech-
anism is a sequence of allocation probability functions xi(v≤i) ∈ [0, 1] and payment functions
pi(v≤i) ∈ R, for i ∈ [1 : k]. A mechanism is periodic incentive compatible (PIC) if at any stage i,
revealing vi truthfully maximizes the agent’s expected utility, given truthfulness in the following
stages, that is,
vixi(v≤i)− pi(v≤i) +Evi+1,...,vk

∑
j>i
xj(v≤j)vj − pj(v≤i)


≥vixi(v≤i, v
′
i)− pi(v≤i, v
′
i) +Evi+1,...,vk

∑
j>i
xj(v≤j , v
′
i)vj − pj(v≤j , v
′
i)

 , (1)
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for all v≤i and v
′
i, where (v≤j , v
′
i) is a vector of size j in which the i’th index is replaced by v
′
i. A
mechanism is ex-post individually rational if the agent’s utility is non-negative at each stage, that
is,
vixi(v≤i)− pi(v≤i) ≥ 0.
3 (2)
The goal is to maximize the sum of the payments
Ev1,...,vk

∑
i
pi(v≤i)

 , (3)
subject to the periodic incentive compatibility and ex-post individual rationality constraints.
2.1 Standard Analysis for k = 1
The following standard analysis relates allocation, payment, and utility functions, and expresses
revenue in terms of the allocation function for the special case where k = 1. In this case, a
mechanism is simply a pair of allocation function x(v) and payment function p(v), and the incentive
compatibility constraint is that
vx(v)− p(v) ≥ vx(v′)− p(v′),∀v, v′. (4)
We will distinguish inequalities (1) and (4) by referring to the former as periodic incentive
compatibility, and the later simply as incentive compatibility (even though incentive compatibility
is a special case of periodic incentive compatibility for k = 1).
Lemma 1 (Myerson (1981); Rochet (1985)). For k = 1, a mechanism (x, p) is incentive compatible
if and only if the allocation fucntion x(·) is monotone non-decreasing, and the allocation function
x and the payment function p satisfy p(v) = v · x(v) −
∫ v
z≥v x(z)dz + p(v). The utility function
u(v) = vx(v) − p(v) of an incentive compatible mechanism is u(v) =
∫ v
z≥v x(z)dz − p(v).
Alternatively, a mechanism is inventive compatibly if and only if the utility function u(·) is
convex and non-decreasing, and is differentiable almost everywhere. In that case, the allocation and
payment functions satisfy x(v) = u′(v) and p(v) = vu′(v) − u(v) wherever the utility function is
differentiable.
Myerson showed that given the above lemma, the expected revenue of an incentive compatible
mechanism can be re-expressed using integration by parts
Ev[p(v)] = Ev[v · x(v) −
∫
z≤v
x(z)dz] + p(v) = Ev[x(v)φ(v)] + p(v), (5)
where φ is the virtual value function φ(v) = v − 1−F (v)f(v) .
3Note that xi denotes the probability of allocation. Thus, the ex-post individual rationality states that the
utility of the agent is non-negative in expectation over the randomization of the mechanism. However, the solution
can be converted to one that ensures ex-post individual rationality, even for random choices of the mechanism, by
correlating payment with allocation and charging the agent pi/xi when the item is allocated, and zero otherwise.
The ex-post individual rationality constraint ensures that if the item is allocated, the payment is less than the value
since xivi − pi ≥ 0 implies that vi − pi/xi ≥ 0.
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Example 2 (The Equal Revenue Distribution). Consider the equal revenue distribution with
f(v) = 1/v2 over the support v ∈ [1,∞). The virtual value function is φ(v) = v − 1/v
1/v2
= 0.
Myerson’s analysis implies that the revenue of any IC mechanism is p(1). Given the IR condition,
p(1) ≤ x(1) ≤ 1. The optimal revenue is therefore 1, which is achieved by posting a price 1.
The following fact is standard and follows from the above analysis.
Lemma 2. Any incentive compatible mechanism is a distribution over posted prices, and a transfer
p(0).
3 Optimal Dynamic Mechanisms
One of the main challenges in identifying optimum solutions to dynamic mechanism design problems
is the complex structure of the periodic incentive compatibility conditions (in our setting, inequality
(1)). In a truly dynamic mechanism, the allocation and payment decisions depend on the history
of agent’s decisions, which complicates the periodic incentive compatibility condition since the
agent’s report at a day i not only affects his allocation and payment at that day, but also all
future allocation and payments. In this section, we reformulate the problem in an alternative form
via a simple change of variables. The main purpose of the alternative formulation is to simplify
the periodic incentive compatibility conditions to ones that resemble incentive compatibility in
static sense (inequality (4)) more closely. The following sections will heavily utilize the alternative
formulation to decompose and solve the problem.
To simplify notation define the expected utility of the agent from future transactions
Ui(v≤i) := Evi+1,...,vk

∑
j>i
xj(v≤j)vj − pj(v≤j)

 , (6)
and rewrite the periodic incentive compatibility condition (1) as
vixi(v≤i)− pi(v≤i) + Ui(v≤i) ≥ vixi(v≤i, v
′
i)− pi(v≤i, v
′
i) + Ui(v≤i, v
′
i).
Define the adjusted payment function
pˆi(v≤i) := pi(v≤i)− Ui(v≤i). (7)
We will use the above change of variables to formulate the problem in terms of the allocation
functions xi and the adjusted payment function pˆi. The PIC constraint (1) can be rewritten as
vixi(v≤i)− pˆi(v≤i) ≥ vixi(v<i, v
′
i)− pˆi(v<i, v
′
i),∀v≤i, v
′
i.
That is, a mechanism (x, p) is periodic incentive compatible if and only if for each i and v<i, the
mechanism (xi(v<i, ·), pˆi(v<i, ·)), viewed as a static mechanism of only one variable vi, is incentive
compatible. We will next express the expected revenue in terms of the adjusted payment function.
Notice that the expected utility from future transactions (6) can be written recursively as follows:
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Ui(v≤i) = Evi+1,...,vk
[
xi+1(v≤i+1)vi+1 − pi+1(v≤i+1) + Ui+1(v≤i+1)
]
= Evi+1,...,vk
[
xi+1(v≤i+1)vi+1 − pˆi+1(v≤i+1)
]
. (8)
(For the purposes of defining Uk set xk+1 = pˆk+1 = 0.) The definition of the adjusted payment pˆi
(7) and equation (8) imply that
pi(v≤i) = pˆi(v≤i) + Ui(v≤i)
= pˆi(v≤i) +Evi+1,...,vk
[
xi+1(v≤i+1)vi+1 − pˆi+1(v≤i+1)
]
= pˆi(v≤i) +Evi+1
[
xi+1(v≤i+1)vi+1 − pˆi+1(v≤i+1)
]
. (9)
Summing up the above equality for all i gives an alternative expression for revenue
Ev1,...,vk

∑
i
pi(v≤i)

 = Ev1,...,vk

∑
i
(pˆi(v≤i) + xi+1(v≤i+1)vi+1 − pˆi+1(v≤i+1))


= Ev1,...,vk

pˆ1(v1) + k∑
i=2
xi(v≤i)vi

 .
Finally, the ex-post individual rationality constraints can be written as
vixi(v≤i)− pˆi(v≤i) ≥ Ui(v≤i)
= Evi+1
[
xi+1(v≤i+1)vi+1 − pˆi+1(v≤i+1)
]
, (10)
where the last equality followed by (8). Given the above discussion we can reformulate the problem
in terms of x and pˆ variables. The discussion is summarized into the following re-formulation of the
problem, and the lemma below. To avoid confusion we will refer to problem (11) below specified
in terms of x and pˆ as the adjusted problem, and the problem of maximizing revenue (3) subject to
periodic incentive compatibility (1) and ex-post individual rationality (2) formulated in terms of x
and p as the original problem.
max
x,pˆ
E

pˆ1(v1) + k∑
i=2
xi(v≤i)vi

 (11)
s.t., vixi(v≤i)− pˆi(v≤i) ≥ vixi(v<i, v
′
i)− pˆi(v<i, v
′
i) ∀i, v≤i, v
′
i (12)
vixi(v≤i)− pˆi(v≤i) ≥ Evi+1
[
xi+1(v≤i+1)vi+1 − pˆi+1(v≤i+1)
]
∀i, v≤i. (13)
Lemma 3. A mechanism (x, p) is a feasible solution to the original problem if and only if the
mechanism (x, pˆ) defined via Equation (7), pˆi(v≤i) := pi(v≤i) − Ui(v≤i) is a feasible solution to
the adjusted problem. Conversely, (x, p) can be obtained from (x, pˆ) via Equation (9), pi(v≤i) =
pˆi(v≤i) + Evi+1 [xi+1(v≤i+1)vi+1 − pˆi+1(v≤i+1)]. The revenue of (x, p) in the original formulation
is equal to the objective value of (x, pˆ) in the adjusted formulation (11). In particular (x, p) is an
optimal solution to the original problem if and only if (x, pˆ) is an optimal solution to the adjusted
problem.
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The above lemma decomposes the problem into the design of a sequence of mechanisms where
each mechanism xi, pˆi is incentive compatible in isolation (i.e., as demanded in (12)) for each
history of bids v<i, and the utilities of the mechanisms are constrained by (13). In Section 3.1 and
Section 3.2 we will use this decomposed formulation to characterize the optimum mechanisms and
identify approximately optimal solutions.
3.1 Characterization of the Optimal Single-Bidder Dynamic Mechanism
We start this section by observing a structural property that the optimal mechanism satisfies, which
will simplify its form. In particular, we observe that there exists an optimal solution to the adjusted
problem (11) that satisfies all the utility bounds (13) for i < k with equality. To show this, we
argue that given a solution to the adjusted problem where some utility bounds are not tight, we
can construct another solution where those utility bounds are tight and the objective value remains
unchanged. In particular, consider a feasible solution (x, pˆ) to the adjusted problem where for some
i, v≤i, and δ > 0,
vixi(v≤i)− pˆi(v≤i) = δ +Evi+1
[
xi+1(v≤i+1)vi+1 − pˆi+1(v≤i+1)
]
,
Now consider another solution (y, qˆ) that agrees everywhere with (x, pˆ), except that for all j > i
and v≤j that contain v≤i as a prefix, that is, v≤j = (v≤i, vi+1, . . . , vj),
qˆj(v≤j) = pˆj(v≤j)− δ.
Note that as a result of this change, all the IC constraints (12) remain satisfied since each inequality
either remains unchanged or δ is added to both sides. Similarly, in all IR constraints (13) either δ
is added to both sides or neither side, except for i and v≤i, which now satisfies the constraint with
equality. Note that since the change only applied to the payment functions, and it did not apply to
day 1, the objective value remains unchanged. By applying the same argument to all non-binding
constraints (13), we conclude that there exists an optimal solution where all IR constraints (13)
bind. We combine this observation with Lemma 3 to obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 4. There exists an optimal solution (x, p) to the original problem where is pi(v≤i) =
vixi(v≤i) for all i < k. That is, the stage utility of all types of the agent is zero in all days before
the last day.
Proof. Consider an optimal solution (x, pˆ) to the adjusted problem where additionally all IR con-
straints (13) bind (such a solution exists as argued above). By Lemma 3, the mechanism (x, p)
obtained via transformation (7) is an optimal solution to the original problem. In particular,
pi(v≤i) = pˆi(v≤i) +E
[
xi+1(v≤i+1)vi+1 − pˆi+1(v≤i+1)
]
= pˆi(v≤i) + vixi(v≤i)− pˆi(v≤i)
= vixi(v≤i),
where the second inequality followed from the tightness of the utility bounds.
Let us explain in more detail how a mechanism that charges the surplus on all days except
for the last day may be a feasible solution to the original problem. We first establish incentive
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compatibility. Take a solution (x, pˆ) to the adjusted problem with binding utility bounds (13)
and its corresponding solution (x, p) to the original problem. At each day i < k, the mechanism
(x, p) gives each type the stage utility of zero since the type pays its surplus. However, periodic
incentive compatibility is satisfied by carefully setting the expected utility from future transactions.
In particular, for some i and v<i, consider the expected utility from future transactions that vi
obtains by reporting v′i,
Ui(v<i, v
′
i) = Evi+1
[
xi+1(v<i, v
′
i, vi+1)vi+1 − pˆi+1(v<i, v
′
i, vi+1)
]
= v′ixi(v≤i, v
′
i)− pˆi(v≤i, v
′
i),
where the first equality is from (8), and the second equality followed from the tightness of the
utility bounds. Since the agent obtains zero stage utility, the report will be chosen to maximize the
utility from future transactions Ui(v<i, v
′
i), and by (12) the utility-maximizing report is a truthful
report v′i = vi. The mechanism is clearly ex-post IR since the stage utility is zero at each day
i < k, and non-negative at the last day. It is not immediately clear, however, that restricting to
such mechanism is without loss of generality for the purpose of maximzing revenue, which is the
reason we study the adjusted problem, concluding with Lemma 4 which states that focusing on
such constructions is without loss of generality.
Given the above analysis of the structure of the optimal solution, the rest of this section reduces
the adjusted problem (11) into the surplus-utility-tradeoff problem defined below.
Definition 1. The surplus-utility-tradeoff problem is parameterized by a single-dimensional dis-
tribution f , a utility bound c ∈ R, and a tradeoff function g : R→ R and is defined as follows
max
x,p
Ev∼f
[
vx(v) + g(vx(v) − p(v))
]
s.t., IC: vx(v)− p(v) ≥ vx(v′)− p(v′)
c ≥ Ev∼f
[
vx(v) − p(v)
]
.
A tight surplus-utility-tradeoff problem is a surplus-utility-tradeoff problem in which the bound on
expected utility must be tight, that is, c = Ev∼f [vx(v) − p(v)].
As an example, a special case of the above problem is when c = +∞; and g(u) = −u if u ≥ 0,
g(u) = −∞ if u < 0. Note that the fact that g(u) = −∞ for u < 0 implies that the optimum solution
must satisfy vx(v) − p(v) ≥ 0 almost everywhere, and the constraint +∞ ≥ Ev∼f [vx(v) − p(v)] is
irrelevant. By definition of function g, and subject to the constraint that u(v) ≥ 0, the objevtice
is to maximize Ev∼f [vx(v) + g(vx(v) − p(v))] = Ev∼f [p(v)]. As a result, this special case of the
surplus-utility-tradeoff problem is equivalent to the standard monopoly pricing problem and the
special case of our problem with k = 1 (see Section 2.1).
Example 3 (surplus-utility-tradeoff with Equal Revenue Distribution). Consider a surplus-utility-
tradeoff problem where the distribution is the equal revenue distribution, and a tradeoff function g
that is g(u) = −∞ for all u < 0, and satisfies g(u) = −u+h(u), where 0 ≤ h′(u) ≤ 1, h(u) ≥ 0 over
the range u ∈ [0,∞). Suject to u(v) ≥ 0, which is enforced by the assumption that g(u) = −∞ for
all u < 0, the objective is to maximize Ev∼f [vx(v)+g(u(v))] = Ev∼f [p(v)+h(u(v))]. By Myerson’s
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analysis (Example 2), the expected revenue of any mechanism satisfying the IC condition is p(1).
As a result, the optimal mechanism solves
max
x,p
Ev∼f
[
h(vx(v) − p(v))
]
+ p(1) (14)
s.t., IC: vx(v)− p(v) ≥ vx(v′)− p(v′)
c ≥ Ev∼f
[
vx(v)− p(v)
]
.
Consider c large enough that the last constraint is irrelevant. The structure of g implies that
the optimal solution must satisfy u(v) ≥ 0 for all v, and in particular, p(1) ≤ x(1) ≤ 1. Since
u′(v) ≤ 1 (Lemma 1), we must have u(v) ≤ v−1+u(1) ≤ v−p(1). Thus, the solution to the above
problem is at most Ev∼f [h(v − p(1))] + p(1). Since h
′(u) ≤ 1 for all u ≥ 0, the maximum value of
Ev∼f [h(v − p(1))] + p(1) is achieved by setting p(1) as large as possible, which is at most 1. The
solution to the problem is therefore at most Ev∼f [h(v− 1)] + 1, which is achieved by setting x = 1
and p = 1, that is, posting a price of 1 for the item which is accepted by all types. Notice that this
analysis generalizes the analysis of Example 2.
We will next define a recursive family of functions, the cumulative tradeoff functions, which will
be later used to characterize optimal solutions to the adjusted problem in Lemma 6.
Definition 2 (Cumulative Tradeoff Functions). Given f1, . . . , fk, define the cumulative tradeoff
functions gˆk(·), . . . , gˆ1(·) recursively as follows. For all i, gˆi(c) is set to be the value of the solution
to the tight revenue utility tradeoff problem of Definition 1 for distribution fi, utility bound c, and
tradeoff function g(u) = gˆi+1(u), when i ≥ 2, and g(u) = gˆ2(u) − u, when i = 1. We also let
(Xci , P
c
i ) be the corresponding optimal mechanism. For the above purposes, we take gˆk+1(u) = 0 if
u ≥ 0, and gˆk+1(u) = −∞ if u < 0.
The following lemma shows that the cumulative tradeoff functions gˆi(·) from Definition 2 can
be used to capture the continuation value of the adjusted dynamic program (11) for any choices
made for the allocation and payment rules in a prefix of the periods.
Lemma 5. For any j ≤ k and (y1, qˆ1), . . . , (yj , qˆj), the optimum value of (11) subject to the extra
constraint that (x1, pˆ1) = (y1, qˆ1), . . . , (xj , pˆj) = (yj, qˆj), if the problem remains feasible, is equal to
Ev1,...,vj

pˆ1(v1) +

 ∑
2≤i≤j
xi(v≤i)vi

+ gˆj+1(vjxj(v≤j)− pˆj(v≤j))

 . (15)
Proof. The proof is by induction, from j = k to j = 1. The base of the induction trivially holds
since when j = k, the above expression is equal to (11) if vkxk(v≤k) − pˆk(v≤k) ≥ 0 for all v≤k
(recall that gˆk+1(c) = 0 if c ≥ 0 and gˆk+1(c) = −∞ otherwise). We show that the claim holds for
j − 1 assuming that it holds for j. By induction hypothesis, the value of (11) subject to the extra
constraint that xi = yˆi and pˆi = qˆi for all i ≤ j is equal to (15). Now consider the value of (11)
subject to the constraint that xi = yˆi and pˆi = qˆi for all i ≤ j − 1. Using the induction hypothesis,
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the problem is
max
yˆj ,qˆj
E

qˆ1(v1) + ( ∑
2≤i≤j
yˆi(v≤i)vi) + gˆj+1(vj yˆj(v≤j)− qˆj(v≤j))

 (16)
s.t., vj yˆj(v≤j)− qˆj(v≤j) ≥ vj yˆj(v<j , v
′
j)− qˆj(v<j, v
′
j) ∀v≤j, v
′
j
vj−1yˆj−1(v≤j−1)− qˆj−1(v≤j−1) ≥ Evj
[
yˆj(v≤j)vj − qˆj(v≤j)
]
∀v≤j−1.
By definition of the surplus-utility-tradeoff problem (14) and the cumulative tradeoff functions
(Definition 2), the value of the above problem is
E

qˆ1(v1) + ( ∑
2≤i<j
yˆi(v≤i)vi) + gˆj(vj−1yˆj−1(v≤j−1)− qˆj−1(v≤j−1))

 .
The following lemma uses the characterization of continuation value of the dynamic program
provided in Lemma 5 to state a structural property of the solutions (Xci , P
c
i ) to (11) in terms of the
cumulative tradeoff functions. Our characterization of optimal solutions is based on the following
lemma.
Lemma 6. Consider a mechanism (x, pˆ) defined recursively from i = 1 to k, given solutions gˆi(c)
and (Xci , P
c
i ) to the cumulative tradeoff problems of Definition 2, as follows. The mechanism at
day 1, (x1, pˆ1) is equal to (X
c0
1 , P
c0
1 ), where c0 maximizes gˆ1(c). The mechanism at day i ≥ 2 is
xi(v≤i) = X
ci−1
i (vi), and pˆi(v≤i) = P
ci−1
i (vi) for ci−1 = vi−1xi−1(v<i)− pˆi−1(v<i). The mechanism
(x, pˆ) is an optimal solution to the adjusted problem.
Proof. The lemma follows from Lemma 5 and expression (15) as follows. Consider an optimal
solution (x∗i , pˆ
∗
i ) to problem (11). Fixing yˆ1 = x
∗
1, qˆ1 = pˆ
∗
1 to yˆi−1 = x
∗
i−1, qˆi−1 = pˆ
∗
i−1, (x
∗
i , pˆ
∗
i ) must
be the solution to (16). That is, (x∗i , pˆ
∗
i )(v≤i) = (xv<i , pv<i)(vi), where (xv<i , pv<i) is the solution
to the revenue utility tradeoff problem for distribution fi, utility bound vi−1x
∗
i−1(v<i)− pˆ
∗
i−1(v<i),
and the tradeoff function g(x) = gˆi+1(x) + x for i ≥ 2, and g(x) = gˆ2(x) for i = 1.
The above lemma suggests a procedure to characterize the solution (x∗, pˆ∗) to the adjusted
problem: recursively (from k to 1) solve for all cumulative tradeoff functions gˆi(c) and mechanisms
(Xci , P
c
i ) as per Definition 2; recursively (from 1 to k), define (x
∗
i , pˆ
∗
i ) given (x
∗
i−1, pˆ
∗
i−1) as specified
by Lemma 6. Finally, use Lemma 3 to convert the adjusted mechanism (x∗i , pˆ
∗
i ) to an optimal
mechanism (x∗, p∗) for the original problem. Since (x∗i , pˆ
∗
i ) satisfies all the utility bounds with
equality, the payment at each day i < k must be equal to vix
∗
i (v≤i).
Theorem 7. An optimal mechanism for the original problem is characterized as follows:
0. (Pre-processing) Recursively (from k to 1) define the cumulative tradeoffs gˆi(c) and mecha-
nisms (Xci , P
c
i ) for all i and c as solutions to the surplus utility tradeoff problem (Definition 2).
Set c0 equal to the maximizer of gˆ1(c).
1. At each day i ≥ 1, if the buyer reports vi, he is allocated with probability X
ci−1
i (vi), pays
viX
ci−1
i (vi) if i < k or P
ci−1
i (vi) if i = k. We also set ci = viX
ci−1
i (vi)− P
ci−1
i (vi).
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Let us now discuss the computational implications of the above characterization. The optimum
mechanism can be calculated exactly using the above transformation and recursion. However, the
recursive computation requires solving and listing the values of function gˆi over a continuous domain
(of all positive utility bounds c) in order to solve for gˆi−1. The benefit of the formulation is that
the information that is passed from round i to round i− 1 is only a scalar function as opposed to a
multi-variate function resulting from the trivial formulation. Moreover, notice that the functions gˆi
arising in Definition 2 are concave and that, in order to solve the revenue-utility tradeoff problem
defining gˆi, only oracle access to the function gˆi+1 is required. So finding each gˆi(c) value given
oracle access to function gˆi+1 amounts to a convex program. Indeed, we can exploit this observation
to obtain a Fully Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) in the case where the support
of the type distributions f1, . . . , fk is discrete. See Appendix C.
Example 4 (The Equal Revenue Distribution at Stage 1). Consider a 2-stage problem where the
first distribution is an equal revenue distribution. By Lemma 6, the mechanism at day 1 optimizes
Ev1 [pˆ1(v1) + gˆ2(u1(v1))]. By Example 3, the solution at day 1 satisfies (x
∗
1, pˆ
∗
1) = (1, p(1)). This
analysis suggests that the following mechanism is optimal.
1. Allocate the item at stage 1; charge v1.
2. At stage 2, the allocation and payment (x∗2(v1, v2), p
∗
2(v1, v2)) are the solutions to the the
problem of maximizing the expected surplus for distribution f2 subject to tight utility bound
c = v1−p(1). In Appendix A, we show that the solution to this problem is to randomize over
at most two posted prices that give the agent expected utility equal to v1 − p(1).
3.2 A Simple 2-approximation
We now describe a simple 2-approximately optimal single-bidder dynamic mechanism. At the core
of the analysis is using the adjusted formulation (11) to identify an upper bound on revenue.
Lemma 8. Consider any feasible solution (x, pˆ) to the adjusted problem. The objective value of
the solution is at most[∑
i≥1
E
[
max(φi(vi), 0)
] ]
+
[∑
i≥2
E
[
vixi(v≤i)− pˆi(v≤i)
]
+
∑
i≥1
E
[
pˆi(v<i, 0)
] ]
Proof. Consider the objective value of a feasible solution (x, pˆ),
E

pˆ1(v1) + k∑
i=2
xi(v≤i)vi

 = E

pˆ1(v1) + k∑
i=2
xi(v≤i)vi − pˆi(v≤i) + pˆi(v≤i)


=
∑
i≥1
E
[
pˆi(vi)
]
+
k∑
i=2
E
[
xi(v≤i)vi − pˆi(v≤i)
]
Using the characterization of incentive compatibility, Equation (5), for each i ≥ 1 and v<i,
Evi
[
pˆi(v≤i)
]
= Evi
[
xi(v≤i)φ(vi)
]
+ pˆi(v<i, 0) ≤ Evi
[
max(φi(vi), 0)
]
+ pˆi(v<i, 0). (17)
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Note that establishing (17) proves the lemma, since the objective value can be upper bounded as
follows
∑
i≥1
E
[
pˆi(vi)
]
+
k∑
i=2
E
[
xi(v≤i)vi − pˆi(v≤i)
]
≤
∑
i≥1
E
[
max(φi(vi), 0)
]
+
∑
i≥1
E
[
pˆi(v<i, 0)
]
(18)
+
k∑
i=2
E
[
xi(v≤i)vi − pˆi(v≤i)
]
,
as claimed.
We will next design two mechanisms, achieving respectively revenue that dominates the maxi-
mum value that each of the two terms in the statement of Lemma 8 can take. The more involved
part of the analysis studies the maximum value that the second term can take, that is maximizing∑
i≥2
E
[
vixi(v≤i)− pˆi(v≤i)
]
+
∑
i≥1
E
[
pˆi(v<i, 0)
]
, (19)
subject to the feasibility conditions (12) and utility bounds (13) of the adjusted problem forced to be
tight for i < k. Similar to Section 3.1, we first show that the optimal solution can be characterized
recursively using tradeoff functions that capture the continuation value of the problem. We will
later show that the optimizers of the recursive problem have a simple form.
Definition 3 (Cumulative Tradeoff Functions for objective (19)). Given f1, . . . , fk, define the
tradeoff functions hˆk(·), . . . , hˆ1(·) recursively as follows. Define hˆk+1(c) = 0 for all c ≥ 0, and
hˆk+1(c) = −∞ otherwise. Recursively, for all i, hˆi(c) is the optimal solution to the problem of
finding mechanism (xi, pi) to maximize
Evi∼fi
[
hˆi+1(vixi(vi)− pi(vi))
]
+ c+ pi(0),
subject to incentive compatibility of the mechanism, and a tight bound on the expected utility of
the mechanism as follows:
c = Evi∼fi
[
vixi(vi)− pi(vi)
]
.
Let (Y ci , Q
c
i ) be the mechanism that achieves the optimum value.
The following lemma shows that the tradeoff functions hˆ defined in Definition 3 capture the
continuation value of the dynamic program (19), and the mechanisms (Y ci , Q
c
i ) characterize the
optimal solution to the dynamic program. The proof is similar to Lemma 6 and is omitted.
Lemma 9. Consider a mechanism (x, pˆ) defined recursively from i = 1 to k, given solutions hˆi(c)
and (Y ci , Q
c
i ) to the cumulative tradeoff problems of Definition 3, as follows. The mechanism at
day 1, (x1, pˆ1) is equal to (Y
c0
1 , Q
c0
1 ), where c0 maximizes hˆ1(c) − c. The mechanism at day i ≥ 2
is xi(v≤i) = Y
ci−1
i (vi), and pˆi(v≤i) = Q
ci−1
i (vi) for ci−1 = vi−1xi−1(v<i) − pˆi−1(v<i). Then the
mechanism (x, pˆ) is an optimal solution to the problem of maximizing (19) subject to (12) and
(13).
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We will next show in Lemma 12 that the functions (Y ci , Q
c
i ), which characterize the optimal
solution for objective (19) as per Lemma 9, have simple forms. We first establish two technical
properties in Lemma 10 and Lemma 11, which we use to prove Lemma 12.
The first technical lemma shows that functions hˆ are concave.
Lemma 10. For each i and c, the function hˆi(c) defined in Definition 3 is concave.
Proof. We prove the claim inductively. The function hˆk+1 is trivially concave. Consider c1 and
c2, and their corresponding optimal mechanisms (Y
c1
i , Q
c1
i ) and (Y
c2
i , Q
c2
i ). Note that the average
of these two mechanisms (Y,Q) is incentive compatible, and has expected utility equal to (c1 +
c2)/2. Thus, (Y,Q) is a feasible solution to the problem whose optimum is hˆi((c1 + c2)/2), as per
Definition 3. In addition,
c+Q(0) =
1
2
(c1 +Q
c1
i (0)) +
1
2
(c2 +Q
c2
i (0)),
and,
E
[
hˆi+1(viY (vi)−Q(vi))
]
≥
1
2
E
[
hˆi+1(viY
c1
i (vi)−Q
c1
i (vi))
]
+
1
2
E
[
hˆi+1(viY
c2
i (vi)−Q
c2
i (vi))
]
,
by concavity of hi+1. As a result,
hˆi((c1 + c2)/2) ≥ (c1 + c2)/2 +Q(0) +E
[
hˆi+1(viY (vi)−Q(vi))
]
≥
1
2
hˆi(c1) +
1
2
hˆi(c2).
The second technical lemma provides a set of conditions that allows us to compare the value of
Evi∼fi [hˆi+1(vixi(vi)− pi(vi))] achieved by two different solutions.
Lemma 11. Consider a concave function h and a two monotone non-decreasing functions u1, u2 :
R → R satisfying E[u1(z)] = E[u2(z)] and with a threshold z
0 such that u1(z) ≥ u2(z) for all
z ≤ z0, and u1(z) ≤ u2(z) otherwise. Then, E[h(u1(z))] ≥ E[h(u2(z))].
Proof. For any z, define δ(z) = u1(z) − u2(z), and note for future reference that E[δ(z)] = 0 by
lemma’s assumption. We will first argue that by concavity of h,
h(u1(z)) − h(u2(z)) ≥ h(u1(z
0))− h(u1(z
0)− δ(z)). (20)
To prove the above inequality, consider two cases. If z ≤ z0, then u2(z) ≤ u1(z) ≤ u1(z
0) by
lemma’s assumptions. Concavity of h implies that h(u1(z))−h(u2(z)) ≥ h(u1(z
0))−h(u1(z
0)−δ(z)).
Similarly, if z ≥ z0, then u1(z
0) ≤ u1(z) ≤ u2(z) by lemma’s assumptions. In this case, by concavity
of h we have h(u2(z))− h(u1(z)) ≤ h(u1(z
0)− δ(z))− h(u1(z
0)), which implies (20). We now have
E
[
h(u1(z))
]
−E
[
h(u2(z))
]
≥ h(u1(z
0))−E
[
h(u1(z
0)− δ(z))
]
≥ 0,
where the first inequality followed from (20), and the second inequality followed from Jensen’s
inequality and concavity of h: since E[δ(z)] = 0, then E[h(u1(z
0)− δ(z))] ≤ h(E[u1(z
0)− δ(z)]) =
h(u1(z
0)).
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Now we turn to our main lemma that states that the solutions (Y ci , Q
c
i ) to the tradeoff problems
of Definition 3 have simple forms. In particular, the allocation and payment functions are constants
that do not depend on vi, but instead depend only on c and i.
Lemma 12. For each i and c, Y ci (vi) and Q
c
i(vi) are constant functions of vi.
Proof. Consider the optimal mechanisms (Y ci , Q
c
i )i,c of Definition 3. For some fixed i and c, consider
the mechanism (Y˜ ci , Q˜
c
i ) obtained from (Y
c
i , Q
c
i ) as follows: define Y˜
c
i (vi) = (c + Q
c
i(0))/E[vi]
and Q˜ci(vi) = Q
c
i(0). That is, the mechanism offers all types a constant probability of allocation
(c + Qci (0))/E[vi] for a constant payment Q
c
i(0). The constants are adjusted to maintain the
tightness of the utility bound, since the expected utility of the mechanism (Y˜ ci , Q˜
c
i ) is
E
[
viY˜
c
i (vi)− Q˜
c
i (vi)
]
= E [vi]
c+Qci (0)
E[vi]
−Qci (0) = c.
Notice that the aforedescribed mechanism is well-defined as (c + Qci (0))/E[vi] ∈ [0, 1]. To see
this, note that by characterization of incentive compatibility, the utility of a type vi in mechanism
(Y ci , Q
c
i ) is at most vi − Q
c
i(0). Since the expected utility of the mechanism is c, we have c ≤
E[vi −Q
c
i (0)] = E[vi]−Q
c
i (0). As a result, (c +Q
c
i(0))/E[vi] ≤ 1 as claimed. Similarly, since the
utility of type vi is at least −Q
c
i(0), we must have c ≥ −Q
c
i(0), and thus (c+Q
c
i (0))/E[vi] ≥ 0.
Next we show that the mechanism (Y˜ ci , Q˜
c
i) is at least as good as (Y
c
i , Q
c
i ) in terms of objective
value. By applying this argument to all i and c, the lemma follows. Let us compare the values
obtained by (Y˜ ci , Q˜
c
i ),
E
[
hˆi+1(viY˜
c
i (vi)− Q˜
c
i (vi))
]
+ c+ Q˜ci (0),
and (Y ci , Q
c
i ),
E
[
hˆi+1(viY
c
i (vi)−Q
c
i (vi))
]
+ c+Qci (0).
Since Q˜ci (0) = Q
c
i (0), we only need to prove that
E
[
hˆi+1(viY˜
c
i (vi)− Q˜
c
i (vi))
]
≥ E
[
hˆi+1(viY
c
i (vi)−Q
c
i (vi))
]
.
Define u˜ci to be the utility function of mechanism (Y˜
c
i , Q˜
c
i ), that is, u˜
c
i(vi) = viY˜
c
i (vi)− Q˜
c
i (vi), and
uci to be the utility function of mechanism (Y
c
i , Q
c
i ), that is, u
c
i (vi) = viY
c
i (vi) − Q
c
i (vi). We will
argure that u˜ci and u
c
i satisfy the conditions of Lemma 11 (by setting u1 = u˜
c
i and u2 = u
c
i ), and
thus E[hˆi+1(u˜
c
i (vi))] ≥ E[hˆi+1(u
c
i (vi))], since hˆi+1 is concave by Lemma 10. We have already argued
that E[u˜ci (vi)] = E[u
c
i (vi)] = c. We will next argue that there exists a v
0
i , such that u˜
c
i (vi) ≥ u
c
i (vi)
when vi ≤ v
0
i , and u˜
c
i (vi) ≤ u
c
i(vi) otherwise. Since u˜
c
i and u
c
i have the same expectation and
u˜ci (0) = u
c
i(0) = −Q
c
i (0), they must cross at least once at a point v
0
i > 0 (otherwise, one function
is pointwise higher than the other, contradicting the fact that they have the same expectation).
Convexity of the utility function uci implies that it must be below a line that connects u
c
i (0) to
uci (v
0
i ). This line is in fact u˜
c
i . That is, u
c
i crosses u˜
c
i from below at v
0
i , and since it is convex, it
must stay above u˜ci for all vi ≥ v
0
i .
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By Lemma 12, (Y ci , Q
c
i ) are simply constants that do not depend on vi. Note that selecting Y
c
i
will uniquely identify Qci through the expected utility constraint, that is Q
c
i = Y
c
i E[vi] − c. We
therefore redefine hˆi(c) simply as the optimal solution to
max
0≤Y≤1
E
[
hˆi+1(Y (vi −E [vi]) + c)
]
+ Y E [vi] , (21)
and let Y ci simply refer to the optimizer of the above problem.
Theorem 13. Running each of the following two mechanisms with probability a half gives a 2-
approximation to the optimal revenue:
0. (Pre-processing) Define the tradeoffs hˆk(c), . . . , hˆ1(c) and allocation probabilities Y
c
i for all c
and for all i recursively as follows. Define hˆk+1(c) = −∞, for all c < 0, and hˆk+1(c) = 0, for
all c ≥ 0. Recursively for all i, and for all c, hˆi(c) is the optimal solution to (21) and Y
c
i is
the optimizer. Set c0 equal to the maximizer of hˆ1(c) − c.
1. (Mechanism 1) At each day i, ignore the history and offer the optimal monopoly price for
item i.
2. (Mechanism 2) At each day i, the buyer reports vi, is allocated with probability Y
ci−1
i , pays
viY
ci−1
i if i < k or Y
ci−1
i E[vi]− ci−1 if i = k. Set ci = Y
ci−1
i (vi −E[vi]) + ci−1.
Proof. Consider the upper bound provided in Lemma 8 on optimal revenue. The above two mech-
anisms bound the first and second terms in Lemma 8, respectively. Mechanism 1 obtains revenue
equal to ∑
i≥1
E
[
max(φi(vi), 0)
]
.
By Definition 3 and Lemma 12, Mechanism 2 achieves a revenue that bounds the second term of
the upper bound in Lemma 8. Note that, in describing Mechanism 2, we have translated from a
solution to the adjusted problem to a solution to the original formulation.
3.3 The Multi-agent Problem
This section extends the analysis of Section 3.1 to designing sequential auctions with multiple
agents. The key step is defining the right change of variables such that the problem mirrors the
single-agent problem in Section 3.1. Once the right formulation is identified, the analysis extends
to multiple agents straightforwardly.
For agents 1 to m, assume that the value of each agent κ on each day i = 1, . . . , k, vκi , is
drawn independently of other values and other days from a distribution with density fκi . For each
i, let vi = (v
1
i , . . . , v
m
i ) be the vector of values of all agents at day i, and v≤i = (v1, . . . , vi) be
the complete history of all values up to day i. A multi-agent mechanism specifies the allocation
probability xκi (v≤i) and payment p
κ
i (v≤i) of each agent κ at each step i based on the current and
history of reports of all agents. The goal is to maximize
E

∑
i
∑
κ
pκi (v≤i)

 , (22)
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subject to appropriately defined incentive compatibility and ex-post individual rationality condi-
tions. In particular, the periodic incentive compatibility condition requires that on each day i and
for every agent κ, given any history of values v<i of all agents and value v
κ
i of agent κ on the
current day, agent κ maximizes her expected utility, with respect to today’s value of other agents
and future values of all agents including κ, by truthfully reporting its type, i.e.
Ev−κ
i
,vi+1,...,vk

∑
j≥i
vκj x
κ
j (v≤j)− p
κ
j (v≤j)

 (23)
≥ Ev−κ
i
,vi+1,...,vk

∑
j≥i
vκj x
κ
j (v≤j , vˆ
κ
i )− p
κ
j (v≤j , vˆ
κ
i )

 ;∀v<i, vκi , vˆκi , (24)
where we sloppily use (v≤j , vˆ
κ
i ) to denote v≤j with the value of agent κ on day i replaced by vˆ
κ
i .
Ex-post individual rationality requires that each agent’s utility is non-negative at each stage and
for any history,
vκi x
κ
i (v≤i)− p
κ
i (v≤i) ≥ 0;∀v≤i (25)
We next argue that we can replace the above condition with
Ev−κi
[
vκi x
κ
i (v≤i)− p
κ
i (v≤i)
]
≥ 0;∀v<i, v
κ
i . (26)
Note that the above condition is obtained by taking the expectation of (25) over v−κi and therefore
is implied by it. Conversely, if a mechanism satisfies the above condition, then by charging the
agent Ev−κi
[pκi (v≤i)]/Ev−κi
[xκi (v≤i)] whenever he is allocated, condition (25) will be satisfied.
Finally, feasibility of the mechanism requires that at each stage only one item is allocated∑
κ
xκi (v≤i) ≤ 1;∀i, v≤i. (27)
Similar to Section 3, we formulate the above problem in terms of an adjusted payment function. In
particular, let Uκi (v≤i) be the expected utility of the agents from all days after i, that is,
Uκi (v≤i) = Evi+1,...,vk

∑
j>i
vκj x
κ
j (v≤j)− p
κ
j (v≤j)

 .
Define the adjusted payment pˆκi as a function of v<i and v
κ
i as follows
pˆκi (v<i, v
κ
i ) := Ev−κi
[
pκi (v≤i)− U
κ
i (v≤i)
]
. (28)
An analysis identical to that of Section 3 shows that the problem can be rewritten using the adjusted
payment function in the following form. We will refer to the following problem as the adjusted
problem.4
4For the purposes of our formulation we take, for notational convenience, xκk+1 and pˆ
κ
k+1 to be the zero functions,
for all κ.
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max
x,pˆ
E

∑
κ
(pˆκ1(v
κ
1 ) +
∑
i≥2
vκi x
κ
i (v≤i))

 (29)
s.t., ∀i, κ, ICκi : ∀v<i, v
κ
i , vˆ
κ
i : Ev−κi
[
vκi x
κ
i (v≤i)− pˆ
κ
i (v<i, v
κ
i )
]
≥ Ev−κi
[
vκi x
κ
i (v≤i, vˆ
κ
i )− pˆ
κ
i (v<i, vˆ
κ
i )
]
(30)
∀i, κ, v<i, v
κ
i : Ev−κi
[
vκi x
κ
i (v≤i)− pˆ
κ
i (v<i, v
κ
i )
]
≥ Ev−κi ,vi+1
[
vκi+1x
κ
i+1(v≤i+1)− pˆ
κ
i+1(v≤i, v
κ
i+1)
]
(31)
∀i, v≤i :
∑
κ
xκi (v≤i) ≤ 1.
Lemma 14. A mechanism (x, p) is a feasible solution to the original problem if and only if the
mechanism (x, pˆ) defined via Equation (28), pˆκi (v<i, v
κ
i ) := Ev−κi
[pκi (v≤i) − U
κ
i (v≤i)] is a feasible
solution to the adjusted problem. The revenue of (x, p) in the original formulation is equal to the
objective value of (x, pˆ) in the adjusted formulation (11). In particular (x, p) is an optimal solution
to the original problem if and only if (x, pˆ) is an optimal solution to the adjusted problem.
A similar argument to that of Section 3 shows that without loss of generality, the optimal
solution to the problem (29) satisfies all the utility bounds (31) with equality. As a result, in
the rest of this section we require that such inequalities are tight. We next make the following
definition, which is analogous to Definition 1.
Definition 4. Themulti-agent surplus-utility-tradeoff problem is parameterized by single-dimensional
distributions f1, . . . , fm, utility bounds (c1, . . . , cm) ∈ Rm, and a tradeoff function g : Rm → R.
The goal is to design functions xκ(v) and pκ(v), inducing uκ(vκ) := Ev−κ [v
κxκ(v)−pκ(v)], for each
agent κ as follows
max
x,p
Ev

∑
κ
(xκ(v)vκ) + g
(
u1(v1), . . . , um(vm)
) (32)
s.t.,∀κ, vκ, vˆκ : Ev−κ
[
vκxκ(v)− pκ(v)
]
≥ Ev−κ
[
vκxκ(v−κ, vˆκ)− pκ(v−κ, vˆκ)
]
∀κ : Evκ
[
uκ(vκ)
]
≤ cκ
∀v :
∑
κ
xκ(v) ≤ 1.
A tight surplus-utility-tradeoff problem is a surplus-utility-tradeoff problem in which the bound on
expected utility must be tight, that is, Evκ [u
κ(vκ)] = cκ for all κ.
Note that given oracle access to a concave function g, the above problem is convex. We can
use techniques from Alaei et al. (2012) and Cai et al. (2013) to reformulate and efficiently solve the
problem in terms of interim functions xκ(vκ) := Ev−κ [x
κ(v)] and pκ(vκ) := Ev−κ [p
κ(v)], and then
map the solution back to an ex-post description of the problem.
The following lemma defines cumulative tradeoff functions which will later be used to charac-
terize the value of the dynamic problem, and parallels Definition 2.
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Definition 5. Given distributions fκi for all days i and agents κ, define the cumulative tradeoff
functions gˆk(·), . . . , gˆ1(·) recursively as follows. For all i and profile ~c = (c
1, . . . , cm), gˆi(~c) is set
to be the value of the solution to the tight revenue utility tradeoff problem of Definition 4 for
distributions f1i , . . . , f
m
i , utility bounds ~c, and tradeoff function g(~u) = gˆi+1(~u), when i ≥ 2, and
g(~u) = gˆ2(~u)−
∑
κ u
κ, when i = 1. We also let (Xi, Pi)(~c) be the corresponding optimal mechanism,
and Ui(~c) be its interim utility function, that is U
κ
i (~c, v
κ
i ) := Ev−κi
[vκi X
κ
i (~c, vi)− P
κ
i (~c, vi)]. For the
above purposes, we take gˆk+1(u) = 0 if u ≥ 0, and gˆk+1(u) = −∞ if u < 0.
We have the following characterization of the optimal solution, which mirrors the characteriza-
tion in Lemma 6. The proof is analogous and is omitted.
Lemma 15. Consider a mechanism (x, pˆ) defined recursively from i = 1 to k, given solutions gˆi(~c)
and (Xi, Pi)(~c) to the cumulative tradeoff problems of Definition 5, as follows. The mechanism on
day 1, (x1, pˆ1) is equal to (X1, P1)(~c0), where ~c0 maximizes gˆ1(~c). The mechanism on day i ≥ 2
is xi(v≤i) = Xi(~ci−1, vi), and pˆi(v≤i) = Pi(~ci−1, vi) where ~ci−1 is defined by c
κ
i−1 = U
κ
i−1(~ci−2, v
κ
i−1)
for all κ. The mechanism (x, pˆ) is an optimal solution to the adjusted problem (29).
Similar to Section 3.1, the preparation above suggests a recursive characterization of the optimal
mechanism as follows.
Theorem 16. An optimal mechanism for the multi-agent dynamic mechanism design problem is
characterized as follows:
0. (Pre-processing) Recursively (from i = k down to 1) define the cumulative tradeoff functions
gˆi(~c), mechanisms (Xi(~c), Pi(~c)), and corresponding interim utility functions Ui(~c) for all i
and ~c as per (Definition 5). Set ~c0 equal to the maximizer of gˆ1(~c).
1. On each day i ≥ 1, if agents report vi, then each agent κ is allocated with probability
Xκi (~ci−1, vi), pays v
κ
i X
κ
i (~ci−1, vi) if i < k or P
κ
i (~ci−1, vi) if i = k. For i ≥ 2 set c
κ
i−1 =
Uκi−1(~ci−2, v
κ
i−1).
4 An Infinite Horizon Problem
In this section we consider an infinite horizon version of the single-agent problem where the buyer
and the seller discount future utilities with a common discount factor δ. Throughout the section we
assume that the value on each day is drawn i.i.d. from a distribution F with density f . We study
the design of simple mechanisms, called “Markov mechanisms,” where the allocation x(vi−1, vi) and
payment p(vi−1, vi) on each day i only depend on today’s report vi and yesterday’s report vi−1 (but
not the agent’s report from 2 days ago, etc). For the first period, we assume that the seller has
access to a realization of the buyer’s value v0 drawn from F and it is common knowledge that the
seller uses that sample. Alternatively, suppose that the seller has been interacting with the buyer
in previous rounds using a single-stage truthful mechanism, and decides to switch to a Markov
mechanism. The goal is to maximize the discounted sum of payments:
E

∑
i≥1
δip(vi−1, vi)

 .
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Since the value at each stage is drawn independently from an identical distribution, the revenue is
∑
i≥1
δiE
[
p(v0, v1)
]
= E
[
p(v0, v1)
]
/1− δ.
Since δ is a constant, the seller’s problem is to simply maximize
Ev0,v1
[
p(v0, v1)
]
, (33)
subject to the periodic incentive compatibility condition. Recall that the mechanism (x, p) is the
same at each stage, and therefore we need to only write the incentive compatibility condition for
one stage. That is, for true value v1, misreport v
′
1, and the value on the day before v0, we must
have
v1x(v0, v1)− p(v0, v1) + δEv2
[
v2x(v1, v2)− p(v1, v2)
]
+ U3
≥ v1x(v0, v
′
1)− p(v0, v
′
1) + δEv2
[
v2x(v
′
1, v2)− p(v
′
1, v2)
]
+ U3,
where U3 is the appropriately discounted expected utility of the buyer from stages 3 and onwards,
which importantly is not affected by the potential misreport v′1. Hence, the incentive compatibility
constraint becomes
v1x(v0, v1)− p(v0, v1) + δEv2
[
v2x(v1, v2)− p(v1, v2)
]
(34)
≥ v1x(v0, v
′
1)− p(v0, v
′
1) + δEv2
[
v2x(v
′
1, v2)− p(v
′
1, v2)
]
. (35)
Finally, we require the following ex-post individual rationality condition for each v1 and v0,
v1x(v0, v1)− p(v0, v1) ≥ 0. (36)
Our analysis resembles the analysis of Section 3 closely. In particular, define the adjusted
payment pˆ(v0, v1) = p(v0, v1) − U(v1), where U(v1) = δEv2 [v2x(v1, v2) − p(v1, v2)]. The problem
becomes
max
x,p
Ev0,v1
[
pˆ(v0, v1) + U(v1)
]
s.t., v1x(v0, v1)− pˆ(v0, v1) ≥ v1x(v0, v
′
1)− pˆ(v0, v
′
1)
v1x(v0, v1)− pˆ(v0, v1) ≥ U(v1).
Define pˆ(v) = Ev0 [pˆ(v0, v)], x(v) = Ev0 [x(v0, v)], U = Ev[U(v)], and relax the problem by taking
the expectation of the PIC and ex-post IR constraints.
max
x,p,U
Ev
[
p(v)
]
+ U
s.t., vx(v)− pˆ(v) ≥ vx(v′)− pˆ(v′)
vx(v)− pˆ(v) ≥ U.
Consider any feasible solution (x, p) to the relaxed problem with some U = U˜ . Note that the
alternative mechanism that adds U˜ to all payments is a feasible with U = 0, and its objective value
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is the same, namely Ev[p(v)]+ U˜ . As a result, without loss of generality we can assume that U = 0.
Note that with this simplification the problem reduces to a static monopoly problem, where the
solution is to simply post the monopoly price. In turn, a static solution is feasible for the un-relaxed
problem. We conclude with the main theorem of this section that Markov mechanism extract the
same revenue as single-stage mechanisms.
Theorem 17. Consider an infinite horizon problem with i.i.d. bidder values and discount factor
δ, where each day’s mechanism is the same and allowed to only depend on the current day’s report
and the previous day’s report (but not on any other day’s report). The revenue maximizing such
mechanism subject to periodic inventive compatibility (35) and ex-post individual rationality (36)
is to simply post the monopoly price on each day, independent of the history.
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A The Utility-constrained Surplus Optimization Problem
In this section we study an important special case of the revenue-utility tradeoff problem, which
we term the utility-constrained surplus maximization problem. Studying this problem is important
for two reasons. First, we will use the analysis of this problem to further simplify the structure of
the optimal solution for the case of 2 days. Second, the solution to this problem will be used later
in Section 3.2 to identify a simple 2-approximation mechanism with k days.
Definition 6 (Utility-Constrained Surplus Function). For i ∈ [1 : k] define the utility-constrained
surplus function gi(c) to be the value of the solution to the revenue utility tradeoff problem of
Definition 1 for distribution fi, utility bound c, and tradeoff function g(x) = x if x ≥ 0, and
g(x) = −∞ otherwise.
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Note that g(x) = −∞ for x < 0 is essentially adding an extra constraint to the problem that
the utility must be non-negative, that is, the mechanism must be individually rational. Recall that
in the revenue utility tradeoff problem the objective is to maximize E[p(v) + g(u(v))]. Given that
g(x) = x, the objective simplifies to E[p(v) + u(v)] = E[p(v) + vx(v) − p(v)] = E[vx(v)], which is
simply to optimize the expected surplus (hence the choice of name). In particular, the problem is
max
x,p
Ev∼fi
[
vx(v)
]
s.t. IC: vx(v) − p(v) ≥ vx(v′)− p(v′),∀v, v′
IR: vx(v) − p(v) ≥ 0,
Ev∼fi
[
vx(v) − p(v)
]
≤ c.
In the rest of this subsection we will characterize the structure of the solution to utility-
constrained surplus optimization. We will use the solution in the future subsections to obtain simple
approximation mechanisms to the dynamic problem. Before we proceed, compare the definition
of the cumulative tradeoff function gˆi of Definition 2 to the utility-constrained surplus function gi
of Definition 6. Whereas the cumulative tradeoff function gˆi is defined recursively, function gi is
simply defined separately for each day i. In addition, as we will see next, the optimal solution to
the utility-constrained surplus problem gi has a very simple form, whereas the solution to the gˆi
problem can be very complicated (we will further study the general revenue-utility tradeoff problem
in Appendix B). The simple structure of utility-constrained surplus problem will be useful in the
characterization of approximate mechanisms for the dynamic problem.
We now characterize the structure of the optimal utility-constrained surplus maximization. Fix
a distribution fi (and drop the index i for simplicity). For p ∈ [v, v¯], let u(p) and S(p) be the
expected utility and surplus of posting a price p, respectively. That is, u(p) =
∫
v≥p(v − p)f(v)dv
and S(p) =
∫
v≥p vf(v)dv. For c ∈ [0,E[v]], let p(c) be the price that gives the buyer expected
utility c, that is, p(c) = u−1(c) (notice that p(c) exists since the expected utility of posting a price
p is continuous and strictly decreasing in p). Let SU(c) be the expected surplus of posting the price
p(c), that is, SU (c) := S(p(c)).
Lemma 18. If c ≥ Ev[v], any solution that gives the item to all types and charges a constant in
[0,−c+Ev[v]] is optimal. Otherwise, the solution is a randomization over two prices p1 ≤ p2, that
is, x(v) = 0 for all v ≤ p1, x(v) = α for all p1 ≤ v ≤ p2, and x(v) = 1 otherwise. If SU is concave,
the solution is simply to post a deterministic price, that is, p1 = p2. In either case, there exists an
optimal solution that satisfies the upper bound c on expected utility with equality. Additionally, the
utility-constrained surplus maximization function g(c) is a concave function of c.
Proof. Feasibility requires that x(v) ≤ 1, and as a result, the value of the problem Ev[vx(v)]
is at most Ev[v]. When c ≥ Ev[v], this upper bound can be achieved by assigning the item
deterministically, and paying all types a constant in [0, c−Ev[v]]. In particular, by giving all types
a payment c − Ev[v]], the expected utility will be equal to c. Note that the value of the problem
is monotone non-decreasing in c since the problem becomes more relaxed as c increases. Thus, if
c ≤ Ev[v], we can decrease the payment of all types and satisfy Ev[u(v)] = c. As a result, in either
case there exists an optimal solution such that Ev[u(v)] = c.
We now prove the second part of the lemma. Recall that an incentive compatible mechanism is
a convex combination of posted prices (Lemma 2). Since u ≥ 0, the optimal solution must satisfy
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uSU(c)
E[v]
E[v]
S˜U(c)
c1 c2c
Figure 1: The surplus of posting a price p(u) is monotone non-decreasing in u. As u increases from
0 to E[v], SU increases from 0 to E[v] (where the item will be offered for a price of 0). At a point
c where SU(c) < S˜U (c), the optimal surplus is achieved by optimizing over prices p(c1) and p(c2).
p(0) ≤ 0. In the optimum solution, p(0) = 0 as otherwise if p(0) < 0 we can shift all prices up while
respecting the IR condition and relaxing the upper bound on the expected utility. As a result, in the
utility-constrained surplus maximization problem the objective is to calculate a distribution over
prices denoted with cumulative density function G(p) such that the expected surplus is optimized,
subject to the constraint the the expected utility equals c, that is,
max
G
∫ v¯
p≥v
S(p)dG(p)
s.t.
∫ v¯
p≥v
u(p)dG(p) = c.
We can represent the above problem using a distribution over target utilities. To see this, for a
given distribution G on prices, consider a distribution GU induced by first drawing a price p from
G, and then mapping that price to u(p). An identical mechanism draws u from GU , and posts the
price p(u). Thus we can rewrite the above problem as follows
max
GU
∫
E[v]
c≥0
SU (c)dGU (c)
s.t.
∫
E[v]
c≥0
u(c)dGU (c) = c.
Note that the above program is the definition of the concave hull S˜U of SU . The surplus S˜U (c)
is achievable by randomizing over at most two prices p1 = p(u1) and p2 = p(u2) (see Figure 1). If
SU is concave, the optimum surplus is achieved by simply posing the price p(c).
The analysis above also proves concavity of g.
Having revealed the simple structure of the solution to the utility-constrained surplus maximiza-
tion problem, we will now use it to simplify the structure of the optimal mechanism with 2 days,
as identified by Lemma 6. Recall the recursive definition of tradeoff functions gˆi from Section 3
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(Definition 2). Notice that gˆk = gk. In particular, when k = 2, gˆ2 = g2. Thus in the optimal
solution for k = 2, the mechanism (x1, pˆ1) at day 1 optimizes
Ev1
[
pˆ1(v1) + g2(u(v1))
]
,
and the mechanism at day 2 is simply the solution to g(v1x1(v1) − pˆ1(v1)), which by lemma
Lemma 18 is a randomization over two prices that give buyer the expected utility v1x1(v1)− pˆ1(v1).
Example 5 (The Equal Revenue Distribution at Stage 1, continued). Consider a 2-stage problem
were the first distribution is an equal revenue distribution. Recall from Example 4 that (x1, pˆ1) =
(1, 1), and the mechanism at day two is the solution to utility-constrained surplus optimization
problem with utility upper bound v1−1, and lower bound 0. Lemma 18 shows that the mechanism
at day two is simply a randomization over two prices that give the buyer expected utility v1−1. This
analysis, together with Lemma 3 that maps the solution to the adjusted problem to the solution
to the original problem, suggests the following mechanism is optimal to the original problem.
1. Allocate the item at stage 1; charge v1.
2. At stage 2, randomize over two prices that give buyer expected utility v1.
In the next subsection we will need to study a variant of the utility-constrained surplus problem
where in addition to an upper bound c on expected utility, a pointwise lower bound cL on utility
is also required, that is u(v) ≥ cL for all v. The value of the optimum solution to this problem is
equal to gi(c− cL), that is, the optimum individually rational solution with an upper bound c− cL
on expected utility. The reason is that any feasible solution with pointwise lower bound cL on
utility can be converted to a feasible solution to g(c− cL), with the same objective value, by adding
cL to all payments. Similarly, given an individually rational mechanism, we can subtract from all
payments and get a mechanism with pointwise utility lower bound of cL. Invoking Lemma 18, we
have the following lemma.
Lemma 19. Consider the utility-constrained surplus optimization problem with additional lower
pointwise lower bound on utility, u(v) ≥ cL for all v. The solution is to offer a randomization over
two prices for the item obtained by solving gi(c− cL), in addition to a payment −cL for all types.
B The optimal revenue-utility tradeoff Problem
This section discusses a partial characterization of the solution to a generalization of the revenue-
utility tradeoff problem.
The revenue-utility tradeoff problem is stated in a much simpler manner in terms of the utility
function of a mechanism, instead of the more standard way of expressing the problem in terms
of the allocation function. As such, we will use an expression of revenue directly in terms of the
utility function, in contrast to Myerson’s formulation in terms of the allocation function Lemma 1.
The representation of revenue in terms of the utility function will allow us to perform point-wise
comparisons that would have not been possible with the more common representation of revenue in
terms of the allocation function. The following analysis is standard and is included for completeness.
Define the revenue function R(v) := v(1 − F (v)) to be the expected revenue from posting a price
v for the item.
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Lemma 20. The revenue of an incentive compatible mechanism with utility function u is
u(v)(vf(v))|v¯v=v + Ev
[
u(v)
R′′(v)
f(v)
]
.
Proof. We express revenue using the equation p(v) = vu′(v)− u(v) (Lemma 1) to get
Ev[p(v)] = Ev[v · u
′(v)− u(v)] =
∫
v
vu′(v)f(v)dv −
∫
v
u(v)f(v)dv
= u(v)(vf(v))|v¯v=v −
∫
v
u(v)(vf(v))′dv −
∫
v
u(v)f(v)dv
= u(v)(vf(v))|v¯v=v −
∫
v
u(v)[(vf(v))′ + f(v)]dv,
where the third equation followed from an integration by parts, and the forth equation by rear-
ranging terms. Notice that R′(v) = 1− F (v)− vf(v), and R′′(v) = −f(v)− (vf(v))′. As a result,
the revenue is
Ev[p(v)] = u(v)(vf(v))|
v¯
v=v +
∫
v
u(v)R′′(v)dv
= u(v)(vf(v))|v¯v=v + Ev
[
u(v)
R′′(v)
f(v)
]
.
Notice that in the special case where v = 0, u(v)(vf(v))|v¯v=v simplifies to u(v¯)v¯f(v¯).
Definition 7. The revenue-utility-tradeoff with type-dependent tradeoff is parameterized by a
single-dimensional distribution f , a utility bound c ∈ R, and a tradeoff function gdsw : [v, v¯]×R→ R
and is defined as follows
max
x,p
Ev∼f
[
p(v) + gdsw(v, vx(v) − p(v))
]
s.t., IC: vx(v)− p(v) ≥ vx(v′)− p(v′)
Note that the above formulation is more general than the case in Section 3 where the tradeoff
function was only a function of a single parameter c. By generalizing the tradeoff function to be
also a function of the type, the problem includes for example revenue optimization problems where
the individual rationality constraint depends on the type. That is, consider a revenue maximization
problem where the utility of each type must be lower bounded by a given function ℓ(v). By setting
gdsw(v, c) = 0 if c ≥ ℓ(v), and gdsw = −∞ otherwise, we can capture this problem as an instance of
the type-dependent revenue utility tradeoff problem.
The analysis of Section 2 (Lemma 20) allows us to express revenue in terms of the utility
function, and thus type-dependent optimal revenue-utility tradeoff problem can be expressed as
follows:
max
u
Ev
[
u′(v)φ(v) + gdsw(v, u(v))
]
− u(0) = Ev
[
u(v)
R′′(v)
f(v)
+ gdsw(v, u(v))
]
+ u(v)(vf(v))|v=v¯
s.t. 0 ≤ u′(v) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ u′′(v).
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If for all v, gdsw(v, u) is a monotone non-decreasing and concave function of u, that is, ∂2gdsw(v, u) ≥
0 and ∂22gdsw(v, u) ≤ 0 (∂ig is the partial derivative of g with respect to its i’th variable), then the
problem admits a very simple 2-approximation: u′(v) = x(v) = 1/2, for all v that are less than the
monopoly reserve corresponding to f , and u′(v) = x(v) = 1 otherwise. This allocation can be seen
as a randomization over two allocations; one is the allocation induced by posting the monopoly
reserve, and the other is the constant allocation x(v) = 1. The 2-approximation guarantee simply
follows from the fact that the first allocation maximizes expected revenue (c.f. Myerson (1981)),
while the second maximizes Ev[gdsw(v, u(v))], together with the concavity of g and the linearity of
expectation.
Theorem 21. Consider an instance of the type-dependent optimal revenue-utility tradeoff problem
of Definition Definition 1. If ∂2gdsw(v, u) ≥ 0 and ∂
2
2gdsw(v, u) ≤ 0, the allocation that satisfies
x(v) = 1/2, for all v less than the monopoly reserve corresponding to the type distribution, and
x(v) = 1, otherwise, defines a mechanism that is a 2-approximation to the optimal solution.
Recall from Lemma 18 that the conditions of the theorem are satisfied by the utility-constrained
surplus optimization function g(c) = gdsw(v, u).
Next we study the optimality of a natural generalization of the allocation rule considered above.
A (α, ν)-step allocation satisfies x(v) = α for all v ≤ ν, and x(v) = 1 otherwise. Intuitively such
an allocation attempts to optimize both revenue and utility in parallel by randomizing between a
pricing mechanism and an allocation that is equal to 1 everywhere. The following theorem specifies
conditions under which such a mechanism is optimal.
Theorem 22. Consider an instance of the type-dependent optimal revenue-utility tradeoff problem
of Definition 1. The optimal allocation is an (α, ν)-step allocation if ddv (
R′′(v)
f(v) ) ≤ 0, ∂
2
2gdsw(v, u) ≤
0, and ∂1∂2gdsw(v, u) ≤ 0, where R(v) = v · (1− F (v)).
Proof. Fix the value of the utility at v¯ and consider a feasible solution u(v) taking that value at
v¯. The infinitesimal change in the objective value that would result from an infinitesimal change
in the utility u(v) of a certain type v is(
R′′(v)
f(v)
+ ∂2gdsw(v, u(v))
)
× f(v)du(v)dv.
First, consider the case where R
′′(v)
f(v) + ∂2gdsw(v, u(v)) > 0, for all v. Then u can be an optimal
solution only if u′(v) is a constant everywhere, since otherwise we can increase u locally and increase
the objective value, while respecting the feasibility constraints (see Figure 2, case (a)). This solution
corresponds to the special case where ν = v¯.
Similarly, consider the case where R
′′(v)
f(v) + ∂2gdsw(v, u(v)) < 0 for all v. Then u can be optimal
only if the feasibility condition does not allow for lowering the utility function anywhere, corre-
sponding to the case that u(v) = 0 for v ≤ v¯− u(v¯) and u(v) = v− (v¯− u(v¯)) for v ≥ v¯− u(v¯) (see
Figure 2, case (b)).
The most interesting case is when R
′′(v)
f(v) + ∂2gdsw(v, u(v)) = 0, for some v. The assumptions
of the theorem imply that R
′′(v′)
f(v′) + ∂2gdsw(v
′, u′) ≥ 0 for all v′ ≤ v and u′ ≤ u(v), and that
R′′(v′′)
f(v′′) + ∂2gdsw(v
′′, u′′) ≤ 0 for all v′′ ≥ v and u′′ ≥ u(v). As a result, if a feasible uˆ exists that
upper bounds u(v′) for all v′ ≤ v and lower bounds u(v′′) for all v′′ ≥ v, then uˆ will have an
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Figure 2: (a) In this case, the marginal value of increasing u locally is positive everywhere. As a
result, unless u is a straight line connecting (0, u(0)) to (v¯, u(v¯), the objective value of u can be
improved by a local increase. (b) In this case, the marginal value of increasing u locally is negative
everywhere. As a result, unless u is as low as possible given the choices of u(0) and u(v¯), the
objective value of u can be improved by a local decrease. (c) The function uˆ is constructed from u
by taking the maximum of a line that connects (0, u(0)) to (v, u(v)), and a 45 degree line passing
through (v¯, u(v¯)). The function uˆ is feasible if u is feasible, is an upper bound on u below v and a
lower bound on u above v. So if u is optimal then so is uˆ (the functions can be both optimal if the
marginal value of changing u is zero).
objective value no less than objective value of u. Consider a utility function uˆ that passes through
points (0, u(0)), (v, u(v)) and (v¯, u(v¯)) such that uˆ′(v) = α < 1, for all v less than some threshold
v˜, and uˆ′(v) = 1, for all v ≥ v˜ (see Figure 2, case (c)). By convexity of u and the fact that u′ ≤ 1,
we must have uˆ(v′) ≥ u(v′), for all v′ ≤ v, and uˆ(v′′) ≥ u(v′′), for all v′′ ≥ v. The objective value
of uˆ must therefore be no less than that of u. Notice that the allocation corresponding to uˆ is an
(α, ν) allocation.
Since R′′(v) = −2f(v)− vf ′(v), the condition ddv (
R′′(v)
f(v) ) ≤ 0 can be alternatively expressed as
d
dv
(
vf ′(v)
f(v)
) ≥ 0.
Notice that the type-independent optimal revenue-utility tradeoff is a special case of the type-
dependent optimal revenue-utility tradeoff where ∂1gdsw(v, u) = 0, so that one of the conditions of
Theorem 22 is automatically satisfied.
Corollary 23. Consider an instance of the type-independent optimal revenue-utility tradeoff prob-
lem of Definition 1. The optimal allocation is an (α, ν)-step allocation if ddv (
R′′(v)
f(v) ) ≤ 0 and gisw is
concave, where R(v) = v · (1− F (v)).
C FPTAS
This section sketches how to compute the cumulative tradeoff functions gˆi(c) and the corresponding
optimal mechanisms (Xci , P
c
i ) of Definition 2 and Definition 1 efficiently. In turn, efficient compu-
tation of these functions is required in order to efficiently compute the optimal mechanisms in
Theorem 7.
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Recall the recursive definition of cumulative tradeoff functions through the following programs:
gˆi(c) = max
x,p
Ev∼fi
[
vx(v) + gˆi+1(vx(v) − p(v))
]
(37)
s.t., IC: vx(v) − p(v) ≥ vx(v′)− p(v′)
c = Ev∼fi
[
vx(v) − p(v)
]
.
The resulting functions are concave as can be established via an inductive argument similar to that
in Lemma 10. Computing function gˆi(·) given gˆi+1(·) exactly would require access to the complete
description of function gˆi+1(·), which is computationally infeasible since the function is defined over
a continuous domain.
We will argue instead that there exist concave functions g˜i(·) that approximate functions gˆi(·),
and are piecewise linear with polynomially many pieces. In what follows we describe how these
piecewise linear functions g˜i(·) are defined, and how the error propagates as we recursively define
them from i = k down to i = 1. To do this, assume that a function g˜i+1(·) is given to us, which
approximates function gˆi+1(·) within an additive error δi+1 (to be set later), that is, g˜i+1(c) ∈
[gˆi+1(c)− δi+1, gˆi+1(c)] for all c, and also assume that g˜i+1(·) consists of polynomially many pieces.
Now define g¯i(·) as the solution to the surplus-utility tradeoff problem with tradeoff function g˜i+1(·),
that is,
g¯i(c) = max
x,p
Ev∼fi
[
vx(v) + g˜i+1(vx(v) − p(v))
]
(38)
s.t., IC: vx(v) − p(v) ≥ vx(v′)− p(v′)
c = Ev∼fi
[
vx(v) − p(v)
]
.
Note that if g˜i+1 is concave, then the afore-described program is convex, and results in a convex
function g¯i(·). Additionally, given the assumption that g˜i+1 approximates gˆi+1 within a distance
δi+1, the problem (38) is approximately equal to the problem (37), and thus the function g¯i must
also be within a distance δi+1, that is, g¯i(c) ∈ [gˆi(c) − δi+1, gˆi(c)] for all c. Even though g¯i is a
good approximation to gˆi, it is not necessarily easy to describe succinctly. We therefore define a
piecewise linear function g˜i given g¯i as follows. Fix a parameter δ
′
i (to be set later). We define g˜i to
coincide with g¯i when the value of g¯i(c) is a multiple of δ
′
i, and extend g˜i to be linear in between. In
particular, g˜i(c) = g¯i(c) if g¯i(c) = mδ
′
i for some integer m. Note that this construction ensures that
g˜i is within a distance δ
′
i of g¯i, and thus within a distance δ
′
i + δi+1 from gˆi. We next argue that g˜i
needs polynomially many pieces in 1/δ′i to be described. Note that the value of the function gˆi(·)
is non-negative and is at most kv¯, where k is the number of days and v¯ is the maximum possible
value over all days. As a result, and by concavity of gˆi, we need at most 2kv¯/δ
′
i pieces to define
g˜i. Finally, g˜i is concave by construction. To complete our recursive definition of the g˜i’s we define
g˜k+1 = gˆk+1, which is fine since gˆk+1 only has two pieces.
Given the above analysis, we can set parameters δ′i appropriately such that functions g˜i(·) are
within a distance of ǫ from functions gˆi(·) for all i, and given any desired error ǫ. Since the error
propagates linearly, we simply need to set δ′i = ǫ/k for all i. Hence, throughout in the afore-
described construction the functions g˜i have polynomially in 1/ǫ, k and v¯ pieces.
The afore-described construction works for discrete and continuous value distributions fi alike.
In the case where these distributions have discrete support, we observe that all intermediate prob-
lems (38) are finite-dimensional convex programs. So we can adapt the above construction to obtain
the following theorem.
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Theorem 24. For any desired error ǫ > 0, a mechanism whose revenue is within an additive error
ǫ from that of the optimal mechanism of Theorem 7 can be computed in time polynomial in the size
of the support of each fi, the maximum value in the support of each fi, the number of days k, and
1/ǫ.
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